SOME OPINIONS ON THE OPINION CLAUSE
rHIS Essay explores one of the least discussed but most I intriguing clauses of the United States Constitution. When closely parsed, the words of the Article II Opinion Clause yield rich insights into the scope, limits, and nature of the American Presidency, with implications both timely and timeless. In a nutshell, the Opinion Clause was designed to clarify the role of a new and distinctly American idea of a President, who would be measurably less than an English-style King, but measurably more than an English-style Prime Minister. Unlike a King, the American President could not compel judicial and legislative leaders to serve as his Privy Council; and unlike a Prime Minister, a President would not merely stand as first among equals in an Executive Cabinet. With the Opinion Clause, the Framers rejected a committee-style Executive Branch in favor of a unitary and accountable President, standing under law, yet over Cabinet officers. 1 
I. THE CLAUSE (AND THE CONSTITUTION) AS A WHOLE
Before we closely examine individual words and phrases of the Opinion Clause, and ponder their significance, let us consider the clause as a whole. At first, it may seem downright trivial, government and popular sovereignty sharply limited the authority of the People's agents in Congress to regulate the People's speech. 13 As Madison put the point in 1794: "If we advert to the nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people."' 1 4 If we take seriously the letter and spirit of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, many of the remaining clauses of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are in some sense redundant. After all, these clauses-implicating grand juries, double jeopardy, confrontation, compulsory process, counsel, and so on-simply make explicit fair-trial rules implicit in the general idea of due process. 5 Under the Constitution's logic of popular sovereignty, We the People retain and reserve certain rights even in the absence of the specific reminders of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. The Tenth Amendment's additional affirmations of proper principles of federalism-of powers retained by states and denied to Congress-are also redundant, as Madison himself was the first to concede in the First Congress: "Perhaps words which may define this more precisely than the whole of the instrument now does, may be considered as superfluous. I admit they may be deemed unnecessary." 16 But if all this is so, what are we to make of the oft-repeated maxim against redundancy? Just this: It is one permissible maxim of commonsensical interpretation, to be applied sensitively and contextually to aid sound construction, not some rigid and technical rule that must be followed even where it defeats common sense and interpretive aesthetics. 7 
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Opinion Clause clauses in a well-drafted Constitution may indeed be redundant in the sense that they are the textual embodiments of the best reading of the document's overall structure and meaning. Why put redundant texts into a well-drafted Constitution? In part to clarify and exemplify the best reading of structure, which might otherwise be ambiguous. This clarifying and exemplifying role is especially vital in Article II, which opens with a sweeping and somewhat ambiguous clause vesting "The executive Power" in the President, 18 and yet nowhere exhaustively defines the contours of "executive Power."' 9 (Article I, by contrast, vests Congress only with legislative powers "herein granted" and painstakingly enumerated in Article I, Section 8. 20 Similarly, Article III vests "the judicial Power" in federal courts, and then proceeds to define with precision the nine categories of "Cases" are we to make of the parallel language in Section 10: "No state shall.., pass any Bill of Attainder, [or] ex post facto Law .... ." If Section 9 applies to states, the repetition in Section 10 would be horribly and unstylishly redundant-eligible for inclusion in the department of redundancy department. To save the Constitution from this kind of inference of poor drafting, we properly construe Section 9 as applying only to the federal government. This construction explains why the Section 9 bans are separated from those of Section 10, which deals only with bans on states. (Here sound textual analysis converges with a structural analysis based on the section-by-section organization of the overall document. For similar interpretive approaches, see Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. and "Controversies" to which that very same "judicial Power" "shall extend. ") 21 The opening clauses of Article II, Section 2 do indeed exemplify and clarify the President's role and powers. If a clause should be read by the company it keeps, the Opinion Clause merits careful attention: it is one of only three opening clauses of this Section, which contains the Constitution's first elaboration of executive power. 22 In this weighty opening wedge, the Opinion Clause is tightly flanked by two of the most important clauses in Article II, the Commander-in-Chief and Pardon Clauses:
The President shall be Commander Even as the sole apex of awesome powers in this opening triad, however, the President appears as a limited figure-as a Generalissimo, CEO, and Executioner under law. He commands the militia only when called into actual service-otherwise they belong to the states (a federalism limit), 2 6 and they may be called up only pursuant to a Congressional law (a separation of powers limit).27 As Chief Prosecutor, the President oversees only prosecutions for offenses "against the United States" (a federalism limit), but not federal impeachment prosecutions, which are instead vested in the House of Representatives (a separation of powers limit 35 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, at 585, 634. Congress may of course provide for personal staff for the President-to cook his meals, and so on. It can also provide for "personal counsel" at public expense. Accordingly, the White House counsel may well advise the President on his taxes. But of course the White House counsel is not a "principal Officer" within the meaning of the Opinion Clause. See infra Part VI. The Attorney General is such a principal officer-that is why, for example, she is subject to Senate confirmation but the White House counsel is not. Query whether But the very need to separate the President's private business from his public business may call for two sets of advisors-one on the public payroll, one not-who may need to meet together precisely in order to draw a sensible line between their proper roles, and address both gray areas of ambiguous authority and areas of overlapping responsibility. There is nothing inherently sinister about such meetings-on the contrary they are indispensable to a proper Presidency. For example, it may be wholly proper for the President's private tax lawyer to brief his public press secretary about the President's tax returns, in light of questions that the press and the public may legitimately ask the press secretary about those returns. 3 6 Conversely, the President may at times want his private lawyers to be briefed about the public policies of his administration. For example, he may want his private tax advisor not to take aggressive positions on open tax questions-positions that, though perfectly defensible in court (and perhaps even winners), may contradict the formal position his I.R.S. Commissioner has taken, or will soon take, in litigation reflecting the public policies of his administration.
The Opinion Clause-though often overlooked-may thus help us to understand better the constitutional principles underlying the famous November 5, 1993 Whitewater meeting of the President's public and private lawyers.
III. "EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS": THE COORDNACY PRINCIPLE
Structurally, the President may not treat the Constitution's other two co-equal branches as his inferiors. 37 Textually, in the Opinion Clause he has no explicit right to demand reports from coordinate branches akin to his right to demand reports from salaries paid to personal staff should be seen as a Presidential "Compensation" or "Emolument" that, under Article II, § 1, cl. 7, may not be increased or decreased within a Presidential term. 
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"executive Departments." (Of course, coordinate branches may nonetheless be free to offer their opinions to him-that is a different question.)
Here too, the Opinion Clause sharply distinguishes the American Presidency from the English Monarchy. In England, the judicial power had sprouted as an offshoot of executive power, doing justice in the name of the King (as in the "Court of King's Bench" and so on). 38 Judges customarily sat on the King's Privy Council, and thus were obliged to offer any advice the King might seek. One proposed version of Article II in the Philadelphia convention had likewise vested the President with a right to demand "advice" from a "Privy-Council" that included "the Chief-Justice of the Supreme-Court," 39 but this proposal ultimately gave way to an Opinion Clause explicitly limited to heads of "executive Departments. 40 Though the details of this shift remain sketchy, the convention had earlier and repeatedly rejected schemes to blend judges and the President together in a "Council of Revision" that would collectively wield the veto power. 41 Unsurprisingly, Chief Justice John Jay and his brethren explicitly invoked the negative implications 42 of the Opinion Clause when, in 1793, they politely but firmly declined to offer legal advice to President George Washington as a kind of informal Kitchen Cabinet. In the words of the Justices: "[T]he three departments of the government ....
[are] in certain respects checks upon each other, and.., the power given by the Constitution to the President, of calling on the heads of departments for opinions, seems to have been purposely as well as expressly united to the executive departments. Similarly, judges may invite the Solicitor General to give them the benefit of the administration's views, but judges generally may not conscript the Executive Branch to offer legal advice on any issue before the court, unless the United States is a party to the case at hand. 44 The notion that Congress lacks power to demand reports at will from the President derives some support from the structural principle of coordinacy, but also from the pointed absence of any Opinion Clause of Article I vesting Congress with the right to require the opinion of the President on any subject relating to his duties. At least on occasion, Congress seems to have accepted limits imposed by the coordinacy principle. As the House Judiciary Committee put the point in 1879:
The Executive is as independent of either house of Congress as In sharp contrast to the State of the Union Clause, the Opinion Clause does not exemplify a meeting of equals. Executive departments are part of, well.., the Executive, whose power is vested, under the emphatic opening words of Article II, in the President. Executive departments are accountable to the Chief Executive. The President does not-and cannot-execute all laws himself with his own hands, but he is both empowered and obliged to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" by his underlings. 49 (Gouverneur Morris at Philadelphia convention) ("There must be certain great officers of State; a minister of finance, of war, of foreign affairs &c. These he presumes will exercise their functions in subordination to the Executive .... Without these ministers the Executive can do nothing of consequence."); 1 Annals, supra note 14, at 481 (remarks of James Madison, June 16, 1789) ("if any power whatsoever is in its nature executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.").
impossibility that one man should be able to perform all the great business of the State, I take to have been the reason for instituting the great Departments, and appointing officers therein, to assist the supreme Magistrate in discharging the duties of his trust. ' 50 Without the Opinion Clause-and the deep structural principle it exemplifies-a (bad but plausible) argument could have been made that Congress could pass laws preventing Cabinet officers from reporting specially to the President. It might have been argued that the Article II Vesting Clause, standing alone, was too vague and open-ended to defeat this law; and the Take Care Clause by itself could have been claimed to "beg the question"-the hypothetical No Report Rule would of course itself purport to be a law that the President must faithfully execute. Even if Cabinet officials, appointed by the President, were removable at will (and there was some ambiguity about this at the Founding 5 l) a President might be left in the dark about what was going on in his own administration, under his own watch. 52 Alternatively, consider the implications of the Opinion Clause if (as some at Founding may have thought) Cabinet officials were to be removable only for cause-such as defiance of lawful Presidential orders. Without the Opinion Clause, even if no Congressional "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" law were on the books, a Cabinet officer's refusal to brief the President might not have been obviously unlawful (and thus grounds for dismissal). 53 Two other readings of the "President may require" language are formally possible in light of the expressio unius maxim of 50 30 Writings of George Washington 334 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (emphasis added); see also 1 Annals, supra note 14, at 492 (remarks of Fisher Ames, June 16, 1789) (Constitution vests "all executive power in the hands of the President, and could he personally execute all the laws, there would be no occasion for establishing auxillaries; but the circumscribed powers of... one man, demand the aid of others."); id. at 637 (remarks of Theodore Sedgwick, June 29, 1789) (executive officers are the "eyes and arms of the principal Magistrate, the instruments of execution"). 51 See, e.g., James 
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Opinion Clause
Though we should not necessarily embrace this strong expressio unius reading, it does confirm the view that the Opinion Clause in general supports, rather than undermines, the idea of a unitary executive.
In the end, the Opinion Clause clearly exemplifies the President's supervisory power over the executive departments. But along with this Presidential power-indeed, precisely because of it-comes Presidential responsibility and accountability for these departments. Precisely because of his power to supervise, the buck stops with him. Indeed, as we shall now see, the Opinion Clause subtly highlights and sharpens the exact form of executive accountability contemplated by the Constitution.
V. "RESPECTIVE": THE PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY PRINCIPLE
Strictly speaking the Constitution does not contemplate a "Cabinet"-a group of department heads meeting as such-but instead calls for a series of different departments. The Opinion Clause does not envision the President asking the Secretary of the Treasury for general advice about the death penalty; or asking the Attorney General for general advice about interest rates. Rather the clause envisions the President asking each officer for advice about her respective assignment. 6° Of course some issues cut across various departments-and so more than one Cabinet member might be asked to weigh in-but the image is not one of the Cabinet as a fungible group formulating executive policy. Instead, the clause conjures up a hub-andspoke model, with the President at the hub, each Cabinet officer as a spoke, and no rim connecting the spokes independent of the hub.
This [HIfad he a council by whose advice he was bound to act, his responsibility, in all such cases, must be destroyed.... [I]t would be natural for him to say, "You know my council are men of integrity and ability: I could not act against their 62 2 Farrand, supra note 11, at 343-44 (emphasis added). Earlier, Morris had emphasized that principal officers, though "exercis[ing] their functions in subordination to the Executive,... will be amenable by impeachment to the public Justice." Id. at 54. Impeachment of "wicked" advisors of the King had been an important part of the English Constitution, see 1 Blackstone, supra note 32, at 237, 244; 4 Elliot's Debates, supra note 11, at 109 (James Iredell at North Carolina ratifying convention).
In a similar vein, Pinckney, during the ratification period, stressed the President's power to "inspect" the respective executive departments in ways that would "check" the principal officers, and if necessary provide the means for "punishing" their "malpractices," 3 Farrand, supra note 11, at 111. [O]ne of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the executive, ... is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility.... It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall.... "I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point." These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. 66 Though Hamilton did not highlight the word "opinions," we should focus on the word here to see the obvious relevance of this passage to the Opinion Clause. And so when Hamilton later dismissed the clause as a "mere redundancy" in No. 74 
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Virginia Law Review quick dismissal occurred because, in effect, he had already expounded on the spirit of the clause-at length, though not by name-in No. 70.
Consider also Hamilton's language in two later Federalist Papers: "[T]he sense of responsibility is always strongest in proportion as it is undivided, '67 and "The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation. '6 8 Oliver Ellsworth, who had participated vigorously in Philadelphia and would soon play leading roles in both Congress and the Supreme Court, similarly touched on the Opinion Clause in the course of an influential essay mocking government by Cabinet and praising a unitary executive:
The states who have had such councils have found them useless, and complain of them as a dead weight. In others, as in England, the supreme executive advises when and with whom he pleases; if any information is wanted, the heads of the departments who are always at hand can best give it, and from the manner of their appointment will be trustworthy. Secrecy, vigor, dispatch and responsibility, require that the supreme executive should be one person, and unfettered otherwise than by the laws he is to execute.
69
These views, expressed by Federalist leaders publicly during the ratification process, closely track the views expressed earlier by leading Federalists in the Philadelphia convention, which met behind closed doors. Early on, when the convention made its momentous decision to vest the executive power in a single person, James Wilson argued forcefully in favor of a single magistrate, as "giving most energy dispatch and responsibility to the office. '70 When asked by Hugh Williamson "whether he means to annex a Council" to the President, Wilson replied that he wanted "no Council, which oftener serves to cover, than prevent malpractices. ' 75 Likewise, Nathaniel Gorham argued that "it would be best to let the Executive alone be responsible, and at most to authorize him to call on Judges for their opinions. '76 Wilson and Madison each countered unsuccessfully that unity was required for true executive power, but the veto, as a species of legislative power, was different.
77
A few weeks later, Oliver Ellsworth argued that the President should be provided with "a Council... who should advise but not conclude the President. s 78 In response, Charles Pinckney emphasized the importance of personal Presidential responsibility: "[T]he President shd. be authorized to call for advice or not as he might chuse. Give him an able Council and it will thwart him; a weak one and he will shelter himself under their sanction. ' 
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Virginia Law Review either Conform to such opinions or not as he may think proper." 8 0 This proposal went to a drafting committee that distilled the idea as follows: The President "shall have a PrivyCouncil ... whose duty it shall be to advise him in matters respecting the execution of his Office, which he shall think proper to lay before them: But their advice shall not conclude him, nor affect his responsibility for the measures which he shall adopt."' The convention never adopted this proposal. Instead the members sent it back to yet another committee for reconsideration.8 2 That committee--on which Morris sat-substituted the Opinion Clause for the Council proposal 8 3 precisely because it was felt that, by its very nature as a collective body, a Council might end up blurring the personal responsibility of a unitary President. As Morris explained to his fellow delegates, "The question of a Council was considered in the Committee, where it was judged that the Presidt. by persuading his Council-to concur in his wrong measures, would acquire their Why does the Opinion Clause speak only of principal officers? One strong expressio unius reading 8 6 would be that the President has no right to require reports from sub-Cabinet "inferior" 
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Opinion Clause officers in the Executive Branch. Of course, the Opinion Clause does not quite say that. Ordinarily, by the logic of transitivity, if the President can command principal officers, and principal officers can command inferiors, then Presidential power over inferiors should follow a fortiori. There is an obvious analogy here to the military chain of command under the logic of the Commander-in-Chief Clause-an analogy strengthened by the fact that this chain-of-command clause immediately precedes the Opinion Clause. A better reading of tie "principal Officer" language is that it exemplifies the Founders' expectation that the President will ordinarily directly pick, act through, and monitor only a handful of personal lieutenants-his inner circle.8 7 As Hamilton observed in The Federalist No. 72, department heads "ought to be considered as the assistants or deputies of the Chief Magistrate, and on this account they ought to derive their offices from his appointment, at least from his nomination, and ought to be subject to his superintendence. 8 8 Although the apex of an awesome pyramid ultimately rests on a broad and vast base, it sits immediately atop a small top ring. While the President is ultimately responsible for all that happens in his administration under his watch, the Opinion Clause reminds us that we should not necessarily tax the President with personal responsibility for all misdeeds by minor officials, because the President ordinarily does not directly select and oversee them. Though ultimately inferior to the President, they report directly to principal officers (or the principals' underlings).
This reading of the Opinion Clause also casts light on the Appointment Clause-the other main clause dealing directly 
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Virginia Law Review [Vol. 82:647
with Cabinet officers (here, relabeled heads of departments).
9
For inferior officers, Congress can vest appointment in the President himself or in a principal officer/department head. If the appointment is vested in the President, there is more obvious direct Presidential control-and personal responsibility. If, instead, the appointment is vested in a principal officer, that officer bears more personal responsibility. 9 0 In either case, the inferior officer reports to, and must be countermandable by, the appointing officer himself. An "inferior" officer thus embodies a relational concept. An "inferior" officer is not merely less than another (as two is less than three and a GS-13 Deputy Assistant Attorney General is less than a GS-16 Secretary of State), but also inferior to another (as an Assistant Attorney General is inferior to the General whom the Assistant assists). This 
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Supreme Court and why they must generally follow that high court's precedents. 92 Justice Scalia's forceful dissent in Morrison v. Olson 93 strongly hints at, without quite driving home, this reading of the Appointment Clause. On this reading, a court can appoint only officers inferior to it-such as magistrates or law clerks-whose every decision may be monitored and countermanded by the appointing authority. A fortiori, interbranch appointments are ruled out by the relational word "inferior": a special prosecutor claiming to be an inferior prosecutor must be appointed by a superior prosecutor-the Attorney General, and not a court-who has the power to oversee and monitor the inferior's prosecutorial performance, and who thus can be held personally accountable for the inferior's performance. 94 The particular delicacy that attends some special prosecutors-such as those appointed to investigate the President himself or his inner circle-might warrant, however, a narrow law that sought to regulate or ban direct, private, ex parte communications between the "inferior" special prosecutor 828-37 (1994) . The argument Caminker sets forth here usefully corrects the analysis in Amar, supra note 21, at 258 n.170, subject to the following refinement: If an inferior court has good reason to believe that its "superior," the Supreme Court, would itself overrule an old Supreme Court case, but cannot do so because it now lacks appellate jurisdiction, a faithful "inferior" court could-must?-disregard the old precedent on behalf of its superior.
93 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 715-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's view echoes that of Judge Skelly Wright, who offered a "naturalo" and "common-sense reading" of the Appointment Clause that "courts of law and the other listed offices were meant to appoint only those officers 'inferior' to them.... generally interfere with the President's ability to communicate with low-level executive officers, arguably it can do so in some rare instances-deriving modest support, perhaps, from the negative implications 95 of the words "principal Officer."
VII. "IN WRITING": TIE PROBITY AND PUBLICITY PRINCIPLES
What if the President simply tried to squeeze confidential investigation information out of the "inferior" prosecutor's constitutionally proper supervisor, the Attorney General? Consider the intriguing implications of the Opinion Clause's cryptic aside, "in writing." A strong expressio unius reading 96 might suggest that the President generally has no right to demand oral information from his Cabinet Secretaries and that Congress could lawfully ban all such ex parte exchanges. Of course, the clause does not quite say this. Ordinarily, it would be silly-and violative of the spirit of a smoothly functioning executive pyramid-to bar such exchanges.
According to the Supreme Court in the Nixon tapes case: [There is a] valid need for protection of communications between high Government officials and those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties; the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion. Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process.
[ [T]he public interest [requires] candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.
97
A more narrow reading might suggest that, in some unusual circumstances, a Cabinet officer might be right in demanding the formality of a written exchange and in resisting an ex parte oral 
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Opinion Clause
briefing. Although a President can fire an Attorney General for any reason or no reason, Janet Reno would not be betraying her oath or defying the Constitution if she declined to brief Clinton privately on the Whitewater investigation. She must be prepared to brief him in writing if asked-this is what the clause requires-but then there will be a permanent record of the briefing, lest anyone later wonder whether inappropriate information was given by the General, 9 " or an inappropriate request was made by the President. 99 Indeed, taking the argument one step further, perhaps Congress could lawfully require that certain Cabinet-Presidential communications about matters involving Presidential conflicts of interest occur only in writing. Thus, although Congress cannot forbid all oral exchanges, perhaps it could ban some. This idea is hinted at in the cryptic aside "in writing"O-for the framing generation no doubt felt that men (and today women) would be more likely to do dishonorable things in private than in public with written records. As James Iredell explained in the North Carolina ratifying convention: "[T]he necessity of their opinions being in writing, will render them more cautious in giving them, and make them responsible should they give advice manifestly improper.... 100 In Philadelphia, the idea of written opinions was hinted at early on, when James Madison proposed that an Executive Council be given the right to "advise and record their proceedings." 1 Farrand, supra note 11, at 74 (emphasis added).
101 4 Elliot's Debates, supra note 11, at 108-10.
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character of the writer, in lasting colors, either of fame or infamy, or neutral insignificance, to future ages, as well as the present."1 0
Other provisions of the Constitution push in the same direction. When the President vetoes a bill, he must under Article I, Section 7 openly state his objections, 103 which are then entered on the presumptively public journal of the originating House. 104 And on the override vote, "the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively.' ' 05 On other votes, Article I, Section 5 likewise gives a mere one-fifth of a House the right to demand a written record of the yeas and nays. 1°6
VIII. "THE OPINION... UPON ANY SUBJECT': THE ExECuTIVE

DISCRETION PRINCIPLE
Though he wields awesome powers, the President may not simply do as he pleases. He must act under law. 07 He must enforce the Constitution, even where he disagrees with it. So too, when Congress passes constitutionally proper laws, the President must execute them, even where he disagrees with those laws. Yet virtually no law specifies everything: almost all laws create zones of discretion, zones in which faithful execution requires good faith judgment and choice. 08 Moreover, even when the law is clear, the facts in any given situation may be less so; reasonable persons may disagree about what the facts are and what the facts mean. Here too, faithful execution will often require the Executive to exercise good faith judgment and choice. Furthermore, beyond legal and factual judgment lies policy judgment: Article II explicitly. invites the President to
